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The Arbitral Award in the Matter of the South 
China Sea between the Philippines and China
What are the Implications for Freedom of Navigation and the Use of Force?
Cameron Moore
University of New England, Australia 
cmoore6@une.edu.au
Abstract
This article considers the implications of the Award for freedom of navigation and the 
use of force in the South China Sea, identifying the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the Award and the questions that remain. The Award also indirectly raised the question 
of the use of force to defend navigational rights. This article therefore revisits the Corfu 
Channel Case for the light it may shed on the use of force and freedom of navigation in 
the South China Sea. This leads to questions of the danger of miscalculation and the 
potential importance of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (cues) in reducing 
the potential for miscalculation to occur. This article argues that the de-escalatory ap-
proach of cues may be the way in which States can assert competing rights without 
such action leading to loss of life.
i Introduction
Warnings about unintended incidents in the South China Sea abound. There 
have been near misses, and indeed loss of life, in incidents between govern-
ment vessels and aircraft from China, the United States, the Philippines and 
Vietnam. There was a collision between a us maritime patrol aircraft and a 
Chinese fighter jet off Hainan Island in 2001, from which the Chinese pilot was 
not recovered.1 There was also Chinese harassment of us Naval Service vessels 
1 James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, International Maritime Security Law (Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, 2013) at 290–291.
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Impeccable and Bowditch in 2009.2 Kraska and Perdrozo discuss a series of 
confrontations between Chinese and Philippines vessels in 2011 and 2012 (in-
cluding those discussed in this article),3 as well as Chinese harassment of Viet-
namese vessels surveying for oil and gas in 2011.4 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia 
argue that China is protecting rights in its eez in relation to incidents involv-
ing the United States.5 Bateman also discusses a clash at sea between Vietnam 
and China in 2014 over the placing of an oil rig by China in an area claimed by 
Vietnam.6 Further, there have been military clashes for occupation of islands 
between China and Vietnam in 1974 and 1988 with substantial loss of life.7 The 
United States has given prominence to freedom of navigation operations in the 
South China Sea,8 and there have been calls for Australia to do likewise.9 This 
leads to questions of the danger of miscalculation. This was a matter clearly 
in the minds of the leaders of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(asean) after the publication of the Award, as they made a joint statement 
2 Ibid, at 287, 310–311.
3 Ibid, at 340–343.
4 Ibid, at 323, and generally, at 313–315.
5 ‘The Nine Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status and Implications’ (2013) 107(1) 
American Journal of International Law 98–124, at 119–120. On this point, see Jing Geng, ‘The 
Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone under unclos’ (2012) 
28(74) Merkourios: Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 22–30 and, for a con-
trasting view, Jonathan Odom, ‘A China in the Bull Shop? Comparing the Rhetoric of a Ris-
ing China with the Reality of the International Law of the Sea’ (2012) 17 Ocean and Coastal 
Law Journal 201–251 and Jonathan Odom, ‘The True “Lies” of the Impeccable Incident: What 
Really Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of 
China) Should Be Concerned’, (2010) 18(3) Michigan State Journal of International Law, 16–22. 
See generally, ‘Agora: The South China Sea’, (2013) 107(1) American Journal of International 
Law 95–163 and Chris Rahman and Martin Tsamenyi, ‘A Strategic Perspective on Security 
and Naval Issues in the South China Sea’, (2010) 41 Ocean Development and International Law 
315–333.
6 Sam Bateman, ‘The Impact of the Arbitration Case on Regional Maritime Security’ in Shicun 
Wu and Keyuan Zou, Arbitration Concerning the South China Sea: Philippines versus China 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2016) 227–239, at 231.
7 see Kraska and Pedrozo, supra, n 1, at 313–314.
8 As to the us Freedom of Navigation programme generally, see Kraska and Pedrozo, supra, n 1, 
at 201–214.
9 See Peter Jennings, ‘Might Doesn’t Make Right in the South China Sea’, Herald Sun, (Mel-
bourne, 15 July 2016), reprinted in ‘Assessing the South China Sea Award’ Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, 108 Strategic Insights, August 2016, 10–11.
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soon after to affirm the importance of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at 
Sea (cues) in reducing the potential for miscalculation to occur.10
This state of tension in the South China Sea begs the question of what the 
implications of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of the South 
China Sea between the Philippines and China11 (‘the Award’) are for freedom of 
navigation and the use of force in the disputed area. Even though it did not 
directly concern navigational rights, the Award addresses claims to maritime 
jurisdiction around many of the features in the South China Sea. Its clarity on 
the status of the various features in the South China Sea as rocks which may 
have a territorial sea, or low tide elevations which may not,12 has direct con-
sequences for the regimes of navigation in the vicinity of these features. The 
Award was also critical of China’s actions in impeding vessels from the Philip-
pines in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, which 
it addressed in some detail as discussed below. Further, the Award raised the 
difficult question of navigation and overflight over disputed drying reefs in 
the  Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (eez), particularly in the vicinity 
of the artificial island built by China at Mischief Reef.13 Questions therefore 
immediately arise as to what China could lawfully have done to deny passage 
to vessels navigating where they may have had no right to navigate, or for any 
State to protect its vessels asserting navigation rights where vessels may have a 
right to navigate; and also what can be done to limit the potential for this clash 
of rights to escalate into something more serious.
This article will therefore look at the three particular navigational incidents 
detailed in the Award and what it did and did not say about navigation, and the 
use of force to assert or deny navigational rights. It revisits the Corfu Channel 
Case14 for the light it may shed on the use of force and freedom of navigation 
in the South China Sea. This article will argue that the conclusions that can be 
drawn from the Award for freedom of navigation and the use of force are:
10 Joint Statement on the Application of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea in the South 
China Sea, Heads of State/Government of asean Member States and the People’s Repub-
lic of China, Vientiane, Laos, 7 September 2016.
11 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted 
Under Annex vii to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea between the 




14 The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), International Court of Justice, 9 April 1949.
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High speed close quarters manoeuvering to deny navigation is excessive 
because it is too dangerous;
Claimant states should not be aggravating the dispute by threatening the 
use of force in disputed waters;
Artificial islands on low tide elevations generate no maritime zones and 
therefore there can be no restriction on navigation in their vicinity;
Escort of vessels for their protection is not objectionable in itself, and
There are no Exclusive Economic Zones (eez) around the disputed fea-
tures so there is no basis to interfere with navigation relying upon eez 
rights as generated from those disputed features.
This leaves a number of questions with respect to the navigational incidents 
in the Award:
What force can then be used to deny navigation?
What force can then be used to assert navigation?
Should states assert or deny navigational rights when there is a dispute 
over the sovereignty of the feature in question?
What restrictions on navigation and overflight should there be in the vi-
cinity of artificial islands?
Does the law provide a way to de-escalate dangerous assertions of con-
tested rights?
This article will address the navigational incidents in turn in order to analyse 
the conclusions that may be drawn from the Award on freedom of navigation 
and the use of force. It will in doing so address the questions which remain 
open as a result. It will then deal with separately with the issue of protecting 
vessels. This article will argue that international law goes some way to address-
ing the questions raised by the Award but it does not ensure that miscalcula-
tion will not occur. This is a matter for restraint at the political and operational 
level.
There is no scope within the limits of this article to explore fully important 
related questions of the right of warships to conduct innocent passage.15 It will 
assume for the purposes of argument that warships enjoy a right of innocent 
15 D.P. O’Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power, (Naval Institute Press, 1975), at 138–145; 
also, David Froman, ‘Uncharted Waters: Non-innocent Passage of Warships in the Territo-
rial Sea’ (1984) 21 San Diego Law Review 625- 689, at 625–657.
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passage in the territorial sea,16 even though China requires prior authorisation 
for this to occur.17
ii The Use of Force to Prevent Passage – The Navigational Incidents in 
the Award
The Award gave detailed consideration to incidents between China and the 
Philippines in two different locations, Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas 
Shoal.
In relation to both Scarborough Shoal incidents, the Tribunal concluded,
Based on the considerations outlined above, the Tribunal finds that China 
has, by virtue of the conduct of Chinese law enforcement vessels in the 
vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, created serious risk of collision and danger 
to Philippine vessels and personnel. The Tribunal finds China to have vio-
lated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 of the colregs and, as a consequence, to 
be in breach of Article 94 of the [Law of the Sea] Convention.18
This article will now consider these incidents in more detail to see how the 
Tribunal reached that conclusion before moving to consider the implications 
for freedom of navigation and the use of force.
1 The First Scarborough Shoal Incident
In the first incident at Scarborough Shoal, on April 28th 2012 two Philippines 
Coast Guard (pcg) vessels, brp Pampanga and brp Edsa ii, were station-
ary in the vicinity of the Shoal for the purpose of handing over patrol duties. 
16 See Ivan Shearer, ‘Navigation Issues in the Asia Pacific Region’ in James Crawford and 
Donald Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1995) 199–222, at 205–207. Note that aircraft do not enjoy a right of overflight 
in the airspace over the territorial sea, see articles 2, 17, 19 & 87 of the Convention, and so 
this article will not address overflight in any detail. The issue of military aircraft in na-
tional airspace without permission is not settled but customary requirements of propor-
tionality must apply (Caroline principles: 2 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International 
Law (1906) 409–13). See Tom Ruys, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus 
Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from un Charter Article 2(4)?’ 108(2) 
American Journal of International Law 159–210, at 185.
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The Award does not state whether they were in the territorial sea but the words 
‘in the vicinity of ’ suggests that they were.19 brp Pampanga reported that, at 
0900, Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (flec) vessel flec 110 
approached it at a speed of 20.3 knots to a distance of 600 yards before turning 
away.20 brp Pampanga also reported that, at 0915, flec 110 then approached 
brp Edsa ii at a speed of 20.6 knots to a distance of 200 yards before turning 
away. The 2 metre high wake ‘battered’ two rubber boats which were transfer-
ring Philippines personnel.21
This incident raises three distinct issues:
Preventing passage that is not innocent;
Action against sovereign immune vessels, and
Balancing the protection of sovereignty against the risk of escalation.
2 The Second Scarborough Shoal Incident
The second Scarborough Shoal incident involved Chinese attempts to impede 
the passage of a Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessel, 
mcs 3008, in the territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal, as well as to prevent it 
from entering the lagoon there. According to the Award, this incident occurred 
on May 26th 2012 when mcs 3008 approached the feature in order to resupply 
brp Corregidor, which was at anchor outside the lagoon.22 Chinese Marine 
Service (cms) vessel cms 71 approached mcs 3008 approximately 7 nautical 
miles from Scarborough Shoal.23 It then engaged in two high speed manoeu-
vres attempting to cross the bow of mcs 3008 at close range. Reportedly, only 
dramatic evasive moves by mcs 3008 avoided collision.24 Chinese vessel flec 
303 then attempted to do as cms 71 had done, again with mcs 3008 avoiding 
collision only by hard manoeuvring.25 mcs 3008 managed to come alongside 
brp Corregidor, after being pursued by flec 303 and cms 71, joined by cms 84. 
At this time, cms 84 passed within 100 yards of mcs 3008 and took a stationary 
position 500 yards away.26 A fourth Chinese vessel, flec 301, took a stationary 
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After leaving brp Corregidor, mcs 3008 attempted to enter the lagoon. cms 
84 then pursued and tried to cross the bow of mcs 3008. The other Chinese 
vessels also pursued and manoeuvred to block the passage of mcs 3008. flec 
306 and three Chinese fishing vessels then attempted to block the entrance 
to the lagoon. Mooring lines from the fishing vessels caused mcs 3008 to stop 
and go astern. As the vessel attempted then to pass astern of flec 306, flec 
306 went full astern apparently in order to ram mcs 3008. According to the 
report of the Philippines vessel, the two vessels came within 10 metres of each 
other but the speed and manoeuvrability of the Philippines vessel averted col-
lision. mcs 3008 entered the lagoon and came to anchor and the harassment 
ceased.28
This incident raises the same issues as the first.
3 The Second Thomas Shoal Incidents
What if the feature is not a rock or an island? The Second Thomas Shoal in-
cidents concerned Chinese attempts to deny resupply by the Philippines 
to its marines aboard a naval landing craft, brp Sierra Madre, permanently 
grounded on the Shoal.29 The Tribunal determined that this feature is a low 
tide elevation therefore no questions arose as to navigational rights within ter-
ritorial or internal waters.30 The Tribunal determined that it had no jurisdic-
tion in respect of these incidents as they concerned a ‘quintessentially military 
situation’.31 Even so, they further illustrate the level of tension in the South 
China Sea and, more importantly, raise the issue of low tide elevations.
The Award described the incident in similar terms to the Scarborough Shoal 
incidents, with Chinese vessels trying to impede the passage of the Philippines 
vessels. In the first incident, on March 9th 2014, the Chinese vessels succeeded 
in blocking a Philippine attempt from proceeding to the Shoal before later at 
least giving warnings by means of sirens, megaphones and digital signboards 
to prevent subsequent attempts. A machinery breakdown led to the two Phil-
ippines vessels departing the area.32 After a resupply of the marines by air, a 
later incident on March 29th 2014 led to blocking and evasion manoeuvres at 
28 Award 420–421.
29 Award 442. For a Chinese perspective on this incident, and others not directly discussed 
in this article, see Hong, ‘Law Enforcement in a Disputed Maritime Zone: A Political and 
Legal Analysis’ in Wu and Zou (eds), supra, n 6, 223–225.
30 Award 453.
31 Award 456, and was therefore excluded under art 298(1)(b) of the Convention as China 
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speed again.33 The Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources ves-
sel used its shallower draft to evade the Chinese vessels and effect the resupply 
and rotation of the marine garrison.34 On this occasion the Chinese vessels did 
reportedly give warnings by means of whistle and some form of unspecified 
communication in words, requiring the Philippines vessel to turn around.35
Two distinct and important issues arise from this incident – the lack of mar-
itime zones generated from low tide elevations, and then the issue of navigat-
ing in the vicinity of low tide elevations which are occupied and disputed.
iii Conclusions that Can be Drawn from the Award for Denying 
Navigational Freedom and the Questions Which it Raises
1 Preventing Passage that is Not Innocent
Approaching the Philippines vessels at speed without prior warning appears 
needlessly dangerous on the part of China. The clear conclusion that can be 
drawn from the Award is that this is not an acceptable use of force to deny 
navigation.
A number of questions arise from this. The first is, what if this had occurred 
as part of an escalation of measures which began with a requirement for the 
Philippines vessels to leave? Just as the Tribunal has not,36 this article takes no 
position on the sovereignty of the disputed island or rock features in the South 
China Sea. Assuming for the sake of argument however that China did have 
sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, what could it have done to prevent what 
would appear to have been non-innocent passage by the Philippines vessels? 
The passage would not have been innocent on the basis that it was neither 
continuous nor expeditious and the stopping was not incidental to navigation, 
nor related to distress, in accordance with article 18 of the Law of the Sea Con-
vention (‘the Convention’).37 To the contrary, it was for the purpose of patrolling 
for law enforcement purposes, which is an act of sovereignty.
China could have required the Philippines vessels to leave the territorial sea 





37 (opened for signature 10 December 1982) 1833 unts 3 (entered into force 16 November 
1994).
38 Convention art 30.
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South China Sea, this would be a reasonable action consistent with coastal 
State sovereignty. Whilst provocative in the context of a disputed maritime 
claim, it is still not unreasonable as it involved no threat or use of force. It 
would merely be an assertion of sovereignty.
A second remaining question is, after giving a warning to the vessels to leave 
for conducting passage which was not innocent, could flec 110 have taken 
stronger action in response to a refusal to leave the territorial sea? If the warn-
ings had been repeated and an opportunity had been given for compliance, it 
would be reasonable for China to resort to a limited threat of force. The Inter-
national Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 1999 stated relevant principles in 
the Saiga Case:
Although the Convention does not contain express provisions on the use 
of force in the arrest of ships, international law, which is applicable by 
virtue of article 293 of the Convention, requires that the use of force must 
be avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must not 
go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Con-
siderations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in 
other areas of international law.
These principles have been followed over the years in law enforcement 
operations at sea. The normal practice used to stop a ship at sea is first to 
give an auditory or visual signal to stop, using internationally recognized 
signals. Where this does not succeed, a variety of actions may be taken, 
including the firing of shots across the bows of the ship. It is only after the 
appropriate actions fail that the pursuing vessel may, as a last resort, use 
force. Even then, appropriate warning must be issued to the ship and all 
efforts should be made to ensure that life is not endangered.39
Although made in respect of law enforcement against non-sovereign immune 
vessels, the principles derive from broader considerations of humanity and 
international law generally.40 Even when defending sovereignty against sov-
ereign immune vessels, actions should be reasonable and necessary. Actions 
39 The ‘M/V Saiga’ (No.2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea), itlos No 2, Judg-
ment 1 July 1999, at paras 155–156.
40 See discussion of the customary international law on the use of force in Cameron Moore, 
‘Use of Force in Maritime Regulation and Enforcement’ in Robin Warner and Stuart Kaye 
(eds), International Research Handbook on Maritime Regulation and Enforcement (Rout-
ledge, 2015) 27–40; and Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 271–282.
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which created a real risk of collision and potential loss of life, as with the ac-
tions of flec 110, therefore would not likely be justifiable. Shadowing a de-
linquent vessel out of the territorial sea might have been however. Therefore 
flec 110 could have sailed close to the vessels in a safe manner and possible 
even have fired warning shots. Risking life through collision however is not 
justified in the case of a mere violation of sovereignty with no accompanying 
threat to life.
A third remaining question is, given the claim of the Philippines to Scarbor-
ough Shoal it would also be reasonable for the pcg to have refused to leave, 
what then? Article 279 of the Convention refers to the United Nations Char-
ter, specifically the requirement to resolve disputes by peaceful means under 
article 2(3) and the specific peaceful means identified under article 33, such 
as negotiation, judicial settlement and so on.41 Further, and as noted by the 
Tribunal,42 the 2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 
made by the foreign ministers of the asean States and China, declared a com-
mitment to freedom of navigation and overflight in accordance with the Con-
vention.43 It also stated an undertaking, in accordance with international law 
and the Convention specifically:
to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, 
without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consulta-
tions and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned,
and,
to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would compli-
cate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.44
41 Froman, supra, n 15, discusses this at 664–666.
42 Award 21.
43 Adopted by the Foreign Ministers of asean and the People’s Republic of China at the 
8th asean Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on 4 November 2002, available at www 
.aseansec.org/13163.htm.
44 Note also endorsement of the Declaration by the United States, reported in ‘u.s. State-
ment Calls for Peaceful Resolution of Competing South China Sea Claims; China Protests’ 
in John Crock (ed) ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States’ in (2012) 106 (4) American 
Journal of International Law, 855–856; see discussion of the Declaration in Clive Schofield, 
‘What’s at Stake in the South China Sea? Geographical and Geopolitical Considerations’ 
in Robert Beckman, Ian Townsend-Gault, Clive Schofield, Tara Davenport, Leonard Ber-
nard (eds), Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks for the 
Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources (Edward Elgar, 2013) 11–46, at 42; and in 
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This would strongly suggest that neither State should resort to any threat or use 
of force. The Chinese and Philippines vessels should therefore leave each other 
alone.45 This also includes the other claimant States.46
While both China and the Philippines accused each other of violating these 
principles in respect of various aspects of their overall dispute,47 the Tribunal 
did not make such a finding and stated specifically in respect of the issue of 
denying traditional fishing rights that ‘the Tribunal does not find the record 
before it sufficient to support such a claim in respect of either Party’.48 The Tri-
bunal did however state that, once dispute resolution proceedings have com-
menced, the obligations under article 279 of the Convention to resolve disputes 
by peaceful means obliged parties not to aggravate or extend a dispute.49 This 
is a further clear conclusion that can be drawn from the Award. Even when 
proceedings have not commenced, the Tribunal referred to the Friendly Rela-
tions Declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 1970.50 It 
stated that refraining from the threat or use of force is ‘inherent in the central 
role of good faith in the international legal relations between States’.51 Even if 
the Tribunal did not apply this point directly to the incidents in question, it 
speaks strongly of the requirement to refrain from the threat or use of force in 
such situations. It also echoes the dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez in the 
Corfu Channel Case in 1949¸ discussed below, that, ‘To answer: vim vi repellere, 
would amount to referring the solution of a purely juridical problem to the 
arbitrament of force.’52
2 Sovereign Immune Vessels
A further question which arises from the navigational incidents in the Award 
is, what use of force is permissible against a sovereign immune vessel? 
Bateman, ‘The Impact of the Arbitration Case on Regional Maritime Security’, supra, n 7, 
at 236–237.
45 Nong Hong states that both sides should avoid using force, supra, n 29, 215–226, at 223, 
225–226.
46 The claimant States include China, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei, 
Schofield, ibid, 28–33.
47 Award 448, 450.
48 Award 317.
49 Ibid.
50 un General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, un Doc. A/res/25/2625 (24 October 1970).
51 Award 459.
52 Corfu Channel Case 108.
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Importantly, it would not be permissible to board a sovereign immune vessel 
in circumstances other than in armed conflict or self defence against an armed 
attack. By definition, such vessels are immune from the law enforcement 
processes of foreign States. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
stated in the ara Libertad case that, ‘in accordance with general international 
law, a warship enjoys immunity, including in internal waters’.53 O’Connell had 
earlier stated that:
…it cannot be doubted that the principles of international law relating to 
sovereign immunity prohibit the arrest of both of these categories of ships 
[warships and other governmental ships operated for non- commercial 
purposes], in any circumstances short of declared war.54
Preventing non-innocent passage is not the same as apprehension for the pur-
pose of law enforcement.55 The options open to the coastal State are differ-
ent and have a different character. This perhaps reinforces the point that the 
threshold for boarding, seizing or arresting sovereign immune vessels is very 
high. In the absence of armed conflict or armed attacks in the South China 
Sea, there should be no justification for such action against sovereign immune 
vessels.
The principles in the Saiga Case would still permit firing at or into a vessel 
where there is minimal risk to life however. flec 110, for example, could there-
fore possibly have gone so far as to fire at or into a sovereign immune vessel 
from a non-claimant State to compel it to leave territorial waters. This could 
only occur after an appropriate escalation, from conveying the requirement to 
leave through to measures such as warning off, shadowing, warning shots and, 
only if there was continued non-compliance, firing at or into the vessel whilst 
ensuring that life was not endangered.56 A controlled action such as this would 
actually appear to pose less risk to life than a collision of vessels at speed.
53 The “ara Libertad” (Argentina v Ghana) itlos Case No 20, Provisional Measures, 15 De-
cember 2012, at 21. James Kraska reiterates the importance of sovereign immunity in ‘In-
ternational Decisions: “The ara Libertad” (Argentina v Ghana)’, (2013) 107 (2) American 
Journal of International Law 404–410, at 409–410.
54 O’Connell, supra, n 15, 965; Ruys expresses a similar view, suggesting that it is a matter of 
international peace and security rather than law enforcement, supra, n 16, at 186.
55 ‘Self-defence and jurisdiction are not intrinsically related concepts’, O’Connell, ibid, at 
964–965.
56 Froman, supra, n 15, considers a similar escalation of force to be appropriate in such situ-
ations, at 674.
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3 Low Tide Elevations
Apart from the Tribunal determining that the incidents had a military char-
acter, a key issue is the status of Second Thomas Shoal as a low tide eleva-
tion. A low tide elevation does not project any maritime zones and there are 
no restrictive navigation regimes associated with it as far as the Convention is 
concerned.57 Rather, high seas freedoms apply to the extent to which they may 
be subject to rules applying within an eez. The Tribunal saw Second Thom-
as Shoal as falling within the area within which the Philippines is entitled to 
claim an eez.58 There could be no disputed sovereignty, as with Scarborough 
Shoal, as there was no rock or island feature over which sovereignty could be 
disputed. A conclusion that can be drawn from the Award is there was no ques-
tion therefore of preventing non-innocent passage or unauthorised entry into 
internal waters. Claimant States still have an obligation to resolve their dis-
putes peacefully. There could be no basis then for China to interfere with the 
navigation of the Philippines vessel or any other State’s vessel, or aircraft, for 
that matter.
4 A 500 Metre Safety Zone?
A question which arises from the Award however is what are the implications 
for freedom of navigation and the use of force in the vicinity of low tide el-
evations? While Second Thomas Shoal has not been subject to artificial island 
building at this stage, a number of other low tide elevations have. The Tribunal 
identified Mischief Reef in particular as a low tide elevation which China has 
built up,59 which does not fall with the territorial sea of another feature60 and, 
more importantly, falls within the eez of the Philippines.61
Under article 60 of the Convention, it is the coastal State which may es-
tablish artificial islands in its eez, including a 500 metre safety zone around 
them. Accepting the Tribunal’s view for the sake of argument, Mischief Reef is 
now an artificial island but not one established by the coastal State within its 
recognised eez. It would seem unlikely that the Philippines would legitimise 
China’s claim to Mischief Reef by establishing a 500 metre safety zone around 
57 Art 60 (8). See discussion in see Schofield, supra, n 44, at 22.
58 Award 256, 453.
59 Award 335, 355, 356, 365, 399–415.
60 Award 256, 456. The Award determined that Subi Reef falls within the territorial sea of 
Thitu Island, 166, occupied by the Philippines. Hughes Reef falls within the territorial sea 
of McKennan Reef (unoccupied) and Sin Cowe Island, 174, occupied by Vietnam. Gaven 
Reef (South) lies within the territorial sea of Gaven Reef (North), occupied by China, and 
Namyit Island, 174, occupied by Vietnam.
61 Award 256, 260.
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the artificial island, and China is not entitled to establish such a zone. Given 
the 500 metre zone is for the purpose of safety around artificial islands how-
ever, it would seem prudent for vessels to avoid sailing within 500 metres of 
Mischief Reef. Overflight of Mischief Reef should also be permissible but low 
flying would appear to be unnecessarily provocative. This would not be a case 
of accepting China’s claim so much as avoiding both unnecessary provocation 
and unnecessary navigational risk. This would be consistent with the spirit of 
the requirement in article 87 of the Convention for all States to exercise the 
freedoms of the high seas with ‘due regard for the interests of other States in 
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas’, even if China’s construction of 
an artificial island on Mischief Reef would not itself be an exercise of a free-
dom of the high seas. This leads to the issue of navigation in the eez.
iv Freedom of Navigation in the eez
The clear position in the Award is that none of the features in question gener-
ate an eez.62 There is also no particular meaning to the ‘Nine Dashed Line’63 
in respect of navigation beyond the territorial sea of the disputed features. This 
means that the conclusion can be drawn from the Award that there is no basis 
to interfere with navigation beyond the territorial sea of the disputed features, 
through relying on rights to an eez generated from those features. The Award 
does address China’s violation of the Philippines eez rights, as generated from 
uncontested Philippines’ islands, through preventing fishing and the conduct 
of oil and gas exploration and exploitation.64 This concerned natural resource 
rights rather than navigation however so it does not change this conclusion. 
Even so, it was interference with eez rights in the award that raised the issue 
of escorting vessels.
v The Use of Force to Protect Vessels
The use of force to protect vessels is a distinct question which has attracted 
attention due to discussion particularly of United States and Australian inter-
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China Sea.65 To what extent can they use force to assert these freedoms? If so, 
what then is the danger of escalation? The Tribunal did not address these ques-
tions but did touch on actions to protect fishing vessels. Its handling of these 
issues provides some perspective for the issue of use of force and freedom of 
navigation operations. This section will address the indirect reference to this 
issue in the Award and then analyse it by reference to the Corfu Channel Case.
1 Protection of Vessels in the Award
The Award addresses Chinese escort and protection of its fishing vessels as 
follows:
Chinese fishing vessels have in all reported instances been closely es-
corted by government cms vessels. The actions of these ships constitute 
official acts of China and are all attributable to China as such. Indeed, the 
accounts of officially organised fishing fleets from Hainan at Subi Reef 
and the close coordination exhibited between fishing vessels and gov-
ernment ships at Scarborough Shoal support an inference that China’s 
fishing vessels are not simply escorted and protected, but organised and 
coordinated by the Government.66
The Tribunal’s concern was with China encouraging illegal fishing in the eez 
of the Philippines contrary to article 58(3) of the Convention, which requires 
States party to have due regard to the rights of coastal States in their eez.67 The 
more important question this raises for the purpose of this article however is 
the role of the escorting and protecting vessels. Putting the lawfulness of the 
fishing to one side, to what extent can States escort their fishing vessels and 
even use force to protect them? The point does not relate just to fishing vessels 
as it could apply equally to oil exploration vessels, vessels resupplying the out-
posts on the various features or even merchant vessels passing through. The 
question here concerns freedom of navigation therefore and not rights to fish.
Interestingly, the Tribunal did not question China’s right to escort and pro-
tect its vessels, only its action in doing so to enable fishing contrary to the rights 
of the Philippines in its eez. A conclusion that can be drawn from the Award 
then is that escort and protection of vessels is not objectionable in itself.
A critical question that this leaves open then is that, noting the discussion 
above of refraining from the threat or use of force in international disputes, 
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what should occur when there is a dispute over whether passage in a particular 
case is permissible or not? As will be discussed in more detail below, where the 
passage is merely an assertion of a navigational right or freedom consistent 
with the regime of the maritime zone in which it is occurring, even if it is dis-
puted, this is not in itself a threat or use of force. China could quite properly 
escort and protect its fishing or other vessels to prevent interference with their 
passage. The escort itself need not be seen as a threat or use of force but merely 
a measure to deter the threat or use of force by others. Should there be such 
a threat or use of force then China would be able to use the minimum force 
necessary to protect its vessels. The measures would be of the same nature as 
those discussed above, including signalling, interposing escort vessels between 
the threatening vessel and its target (which is not the same as threatening col-
lision) and possibly even firing at or into vessels where life will not be endan-
gered.68 Where the threat derives from sovereign immune vessels, such action 
would not normally include boarding them for the reasons discussed above. 
The Corfu Channel Case is close to being on point here and must form a part 
of any analysis of the relationship between the exercise of navigational rights 
and the use of force.
2 The Corfu Channel Case
Vessels from other States, whether claimants to South China Sea features or 
not, should equally be able to exercise their navigational rights and freedoms, 
including taking action to protect their vessels if subject to the threat or use 
of force. This could extend to escorting and protecting vessels to deter such 
threat or use of force. It is important however that the exercise of navigational 
rights and freedoms clearly be just that, and not appear to be a threat or use 
of force in themselves. Warships can still be ready and able to defend them-
selves. This is not a new issue. It arose in the Corfu Channel Case. Of the inci-
dents between the United Kingdom and Albania in 1946 which led to the case, 
O’Connell stated:
The important feature of the court’s judgment was that the right of pas-
sage of the two cruisers and the two destroyers was not affected by the 
fact that they were at actions stations in view of an earlier attack from 
68 As to proportionality in self defence at sea, see Kiari Neri, ‘The Use of Force by Military 
Vessel Protection Detachments’, (2012) 51(1) The Military Law and Law of War Review, 
73–95, at 86–87.
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shore batteries … the fact that the ships were closed up did not present 
an ostensible threat to the coastal state.69
The statement of the facts of the case in the judgment is succinct:
On October 22nd, 1946, a squadron of British warships, the cruisers Mau-
ritius and Leander and the destroyers Saumarez and Volage, left the port 
of Corfu and proceeded northward through a channel previously swept 
for mines in the North Corfu Strait. The cruiser Mauritius was leading, 
followed by the destroyer Saumarez; at a certain distance thereafter came 
the cruiser Leander followed by the destroyer Volage. Outside the Bay of 
Saranda, Saumarez struck a mine and was heavily damaged. Volage was 
ordered to give her assistance and to take her in tow. Whilst towing the 
damaged ship, Volage struck a mine and was much damaged. Neverthe-
less, she succeeded in towing the other ship back to Corfu. Three weeks 
later, on November 13th, the North Corfu Channel was swept by British 
minesweepers and twenty-two moored mines were cut.70
With respect to the approach of engaging in innocent passage despite the 
threat of the use of force from the coastal State to prevent it, the International 
Court of Justice stated:
…the object of sending the warships through the Strait was not only to 
carry out a passage for the purposes of navigation, but also to test Alba-
nia’s attitude… The legality of this measure cannot be disputed, provided 
that it was carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of 
international law. The “mission” was designed to affirm a right which had 
been unjustly denied. The Government of the United Kingdom was not 
bound to abstain from exercising its right of passage, which the Albanian 
Government had illegally denied.71
69 O’Connell, supra, n 15, at 104. O’Connell also discusses the case, with less analysis, in The 
International Law of the Sea: Volume i (Clarendon Press, 1982) at 306–314. For a view sym-
pathetic to the British assertion of the right of passage see Kraska and Pedrozo, supra, n 1, 
at 219–222; also C.J. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea (David McKay Company, 
6th ed, 1967) at 471–472.
70 Corfu Channel Case at 12.
71 Ibid, at 30, although the subsequent mine clearance operation was found to be a violation 
of Albania’s sovereignty, at 36.
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The difficulty still remains in ascertaining whether passage is innocent. Even 
if states have a right of innocent passage in the territorial sea of the features 
of the South China Sea, these seas are not necessarily routes normally used for 
international navigation such as the Strait of Saranda in the Corfu Channel. 
This was an international strait and the Court expressly avoided commenting 
on the territorial sea not within international straits. Schofield notes that the 
disputed islands of the South China Sea are marked as ‘Dangerous Ground’ on 
navigational charts and that much maritime traffic skirts to the west or east of 
the area.72 The state in occupation of the feature may well perceive the pres-
ence of warships in the territorial sea as threatening if they have no obvious 
navigational reason to be there. The lack of a navigational reason for the pas-
sage, together with a sensitive international political context, may well lead to 
just the sort of miscalculation that saw loss of life in the Corfu Channel in 1946. 
This could be the case whether the coastal state requires prior notification or 
authorisation for the passage of warships or not. This is not to deny the right 
of innocent passage of the warships, but it does point to how an unnecessary 
passage might be perceived as non-innocent passage.
The difference between a task group of warships exercising innocent pas-
sage and an attacking fleet might appear to be very little. O’Connell stated that:
The task [group] was obliged to follow this channel at one point so that 
the ships faced directly towards the Albanian port of Saranda, which 
made their conduct appear unnecessarily threatening… The right would 
not have lapsed for want of exercise, whereas there were risks in its as-
sertion at a time of high political tension … The loss of ships and men 
was a product of the Royal Navy’s incomprehension as much as of Balkan 
brigandage.73
Ruys and Froman emphasise the importance of context in determining the le-
gality of a forceful response to an incursion74 and, in 1995, Shearer stated of the 
South China Sea, ‘For the time being, navigators are wise to give these disputed 
territories a wide berth’.75 The law can only go so far in preventing escalation 
where both sides believe they have a right to use force to defend their vessels, 
aircraft or coastal State sovereignty.76
72 Schofield, supra, n 44, at 40.
73 O’Connell, supra, n 15, 107–108.
74 Ruys, supra, n 16, at 175–176. Froman, supra, n 15, at 657.
75 Shearer, supra, n 16, at 212.
76 See Froman, supra, n 15, at 675. Kraska and Pedrozo, supra, n 1, at 247–252, discuss con-
frontations between Libya and the us over us freedom of navigation assertions during 
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3 The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
To exercise the right to use force, even if minimal and non-lethal and against 
a State vessel conducting non-innocent passage, creates the potential for dan-
gerous miscalculation, escalation of force, loss of life and threats to interna-
tional peace and security.77 The need to balance these considerations lends 
itself to a case by case analysis rather than a clear simple position, but the risks 
associated with miscalculation suggest erring on the side of caution. It would 
have been helpful if the Arbitral Tribunal had elaborated on the use of force to 
prevent non-innocent passage by sovereign immune vessels. It did not have to 
do so to decide the questions before it so it is easy to see why the Tribunal did 
not. Even so, the issue of the use of force against sovereign immune vessels in 
disputed waters in the South China Sea remains very much alive and of con-
cern. The second Scarborough Shoal incident amply illustrates this.
In the course of an incident arising at sea, there will be no court on hand 
to determine which side has the better claim. It will be very much a matter 
for the practical good sense of the mariners or aviators concerned as to the 
steps to avoid dangerous escalation. This is the role of the Code for Unplanned 
Encounters at Sea, which is not an international legal instrument but rather 
a professional understanding developed by the Western Pacific Naval Sympo-
sium (wpns). The wpns is a meeting of the professional chiefs of the navies 
of the region.
The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea states its own purpose and char-
acter in its opening paragraphs:
1.1.1 The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (wpns) “Code for Unplanned 
Encounters at Sea” (cues) offers a means by which navies may develop 
mutually rewarding international cooperation and transparency and 
provide leadership and broad-based involvement in establishing inter-
national standards in relation to the use of the sea. The document is not 
legally binding; rather, it’s a coordinated means of communication to 
maximise safety at sea.
1.1.2 CUES offers safety measures and a means to limit mutual interfer-
ence, to limit uncertainty, and to facilitate communication when naval 
ships or naval aircraft encounter each other in an unplanned manner. 
the 1980s. The us destroyed a number of Libyan aircraft and vessels in different incidents, 
arguing self defence. O’Connell discusses self defence of warships supra, n 15, at 70–82, 
172–174. See also Dale Stephens, ‘Rules of Engagement and the Concept of Unit Self De-
fense’ (1998) 45 Naval Law Review 126–151.
77 Froman, ibid, shares this view, at 675.
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Units making programmed contact should use procedures agreed be-
tween their national command authorities.
Interestingly, the final version of cues was approved at Qingdao in China on 
April 22nd 2014, around the time of the Second Thomas Shoal incidents de-
scribed above. Notably, the heads of the member States of asean endorsed 
cues on September 7th 2016, soon after the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on 
July 12th 2016. The Joint Statement on the Application of the Code for Unplanned 
Encounters at Sea in the South China Sea affirmed that this was done as part 
of a:
commitment to maintaining regional peace and stability, maximum 
safety at sea, promoting good neighbourliness and reducing risks during 
mutual unplanned encounters in air and at sea, and strengthening coop-
eration among navies.78
Importantly, cues only applies to navies. Given that coastguards are usually 
not as well armed as navies, at least it applies where there is the greatest ca-
pacity for the use of lethal force. cues itself is relatively brief and provides for 
manoeuvring and communication procedures. For the most part, the manoeu-
vring procedures reflect the Collision Regulations79 and the communication 
procedures are relatively simple. However, the more substantive provision of 
cues is clause 2.8.1, which states that the prudent commander should avoid:80
(a) Simulation of attacks by aiming guns, missiles, fire control radars, tor-
pedo tubes or other weapons in the direction of vessels or aircraft 
encountered.
(b) Except in cases of distress, the discharge of signal rockets, weapons or 
other objects in the direction of vessels or aircraft encountered.
(c) Illumination of the navigation bridges or aircraft cockpits.
78 Supra, n 10.
79 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, concluded 20 
October 1972, 1050 unts 1976 (entered into force 15 July 1977).
80 See discussion in Shearer, supra, n 16, at 213, and, on avoiding incidents at sea; W.S.G. Bate-
man, ‘Maritime Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Asian Pacific Region 
and the Law of the Sea’ in Crawford and Rothwell, supra, n 16, 222–234, at 230–233. Geng, 
supra, n 5, advocates that States should ‘create dialogues and form agreements to help 
clarify the contours of military activity in the eez’, at 30.
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(d) The use of laser in such a manner as to cause harm to personnel or dam-
age to equipment onboard vessels or aircraft encountered.
(e) Aerobatics and simulated attacks in the vicinity of ships encountered.
Such actions should go some way to avoiding the initiation of a response in 
self defence. Problematically, there is an argument that it does not apply in 
the territorial sea.81 Although cues does not state its geographical area of 
application, clause 1.5.2 states that it ‘does not supersede international civil 
aviation rules or rules applicable under international agreements or treaties 
or international law’. Practically, it should make little difference whether it 
strictly applies to the territorial sea or not. The actions to be avoided would be 
provocative whether in the territorial sea or the eez. Given that cues has ex-
isted in some form since at least 2000,82 but received asean endorsement just 
after the Arbitral Tribunal decision, it may be that implementation of cues 
is the best hope at this stage of avoiding a dangerous escalation in the South 
China Sea. It remains to be seen if it will be effective if a freedom of navigation 
incident does arise.
vi Conclusion
The Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of the South China Sea between 
the Philippines and China assists in clarifying the geographical status, although 
not the sovereignty, of many of the features in dispute. The Award is also clear 
on excessive uses of force to deny navigation in the vicinity of the features. This 
clarification allows the following conclusions, as stated in the introduction, to 
be drawn from the Award in respect of freedom of navigation and the use of 
force:
81 Discussed in ‘Multilateral Naval Code of Conduct Aims to Prevent Unintended Conflict 
in Contested Areas of East and South China Sea’ in Kristina Daugirdas and Julian Davis 
Mortenson (eds), ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International 
Law’ (2014) 108(3) American Journal of International Law 529–532, at 531; also Ronald 
O’Rourke, ‘Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (eez) Disputes Involving 
China: Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service Report, June 6th, 2014, at 9.
82 Chris Rahman, ‘Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast Asia and the 
Southwest Pacific: Status and Prospects’ (2001) Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre 
and Centre for Maritime Policy Article No 7, at 31. Rahman also endorses the idea of greater 
cooperation through cues, at 57 and 62.
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High speed close quarters manoeuvring to deny navigation is excessive 
because it is too dangerous;
Claimant states should not be aggravating the dispute by threatening the 
use of force in disputed waters;
Artificial islands on low tide elevations generate no maritime zones and 
therefore there can be no restriction on navigation in their vicinity;
Escort of vessels for their protection is not objectionable in itself, and
There are no Exclusive Economic Zones (eez) around the disputed fea-
tures so there is no basis to interfere with navigation relying upon eez 
rights as generated from disputed features.
Its treatment of the navigational incidents at Scarborough Shoal and Second 
Thomas Shoal raises further questions of the freedom of navigation and the 
use of force. While it was not really for the Tribunal to address these ques-
tions, the history of incidents in the South China Sea and the potential risk 
to life demand a careful consideration of the Award for its implications for 
these issues.
With respect to preventing non-innocent passage in the territorial sea and 
the Scarborough Shoal incidents, the Award is clear that risking high speed 
collision is not lawful. It does not specifically mention the risk to life but the 
implication is obvious. This suggests that lower level uses of force may be ac-
ceptable. Even firing at or into a vessel in a controlled way may be less danger-
ous than risking a high speed collision.
The Second Thomas Shoal incident raises similar questions about the risks 
of high speed collision but the distinctive issue here is the status of the feature. 
It generates no maritime zones and no question can arise of preventing non-
innocent passage or unauthorised entry into internal waters. This has implica-
tions for the artificial island which China has built on Mischief Reef within 
the Philippines eez. It also cannot generate any maritime zones, not even a 
500 metre safety zone, but prudence would suggest avoiding sailing or flying 
within 500 metres of the feature consistent with other artificial islands.
The reference in the Award to China using enforcement vessels to protect its 
fishing fleet raised the question of enforcing freedom of navigation and the use 
of force to protect such action generally. The Corfu Channel Case made clear 
that enforcing navigational rights is not in itself a use of force, but it would 
be permissible to use force to protect such action. Given the loss of life in the 
incident that led to that case, balancing the enforcement of navigational rights 
with the risk to life must be front of mind. The asean statement on cues not 
long after the publication of the Award clearly suggests that it is front of mind 
for many in the region.
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This article does not concern itself with whether a particular claim in the 
South China Sea is valid or not, only the level of force which a State may use to 
enforce its claim, whether as a coastal State or as a flag State. The mere pres-
ence of a foreign warship in the territorial sea does not of itself amount to an 
armed attack and does not justify the use of lethal force. However, the potential 
for misjudging whether enforcement of a right is actually an attack requiring a 
forceful response in self defence is clearly high. Measures such as observance 
of cues will hopefully go some way to reducing the risk of misjudgement, mis-
calculation or escalation.
The Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of the South China Sea be-
tween the Philippines and China, in so far as it is accepted, has clarified some 
points but it also has raised further questions in respect of freedom of naviga-
tion and the use of force in the South China Sea. There is international law 
which addresses some of the questions but it only goes so far. If further loss of 
life is to be avoided, it will require restraint at an operational and political level 
which the law can encourage but not ensure.
